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Abstract 
It is important for nuclear power plant safety whether the safety system can work well or not in seismic condition. 
Seismic capacity data are important parameters to describe the component reliability, based on which the High 
Confidence, Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) for component can be obtained by seismic margin evaluation. 
However, other than median ground acceleration capacity, the aleatory and epistemic uncertainties are also key 
factors for component reliability, so the seismic hazard curve is one of the important affecting factors and should be 
taken into account in the system reliability analysis. In this paper, passive residual heat removal system in AP1000 is 
calculated as an example, Fault Tree(FT) method is used to analyze the system reliability at different ground 
acceleration levels, the contribution to the system failure of components having different uncertainty parameters are 
given. And Monte Carlo(MC) simulation is used to evaluate the system reliability in seismic situation based on 
different seismic hazard curves, the effect of seismic hazard curve and seismic capacity uncertainty are put forward. 
Then the following conclusion is gotten: since the impact of seismic capacity uncertainty on the system reliability is 
affected by the relationship between the median ground acceleration capacity of the component and the ground 
acceleration level, that is, when the median ground acceleration capacity of the component is much higher than the 
ground acceleration level, the higher is the uncertainty, the higher is the component failure probability, when the 
median ground acceleration capacity of the component is close to or even higher than the ground acceleration level, 
the component seismic capacity uncertainty may decrease the component failure probability, so the system reliability 
and the main contributors are decided by the seismic capacity data and seismic hazard curve synthetically. 
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1. Main text  
More attention is paid to nuclear power plant safety under seismic situation in recent years, especially 
after Fukushima nuclear accident. In seismic probabilistic safety assessment (PSA), more effort is paid to 
the risk-based seismic margin analysis [1,2,3,4], in which the value of High Confidence, Low Probability 
of Failure (HCLPF) is used to evaluate the seismic margin of the equipment. From the mathematical 
perspective of a probability distribution on capacity developed in seismic PSA calculation, the HCLPF 
capacity value is approximately equal to a 95% confidence of not exceeding about a 5% probability of 
failure. From the definition, it can be seen that the HCLPF of the equipment is higher, the seismic 
capacity is better. However, in the seismic margin analysis, the effect of the uncertainty of seismic 
capacity is not fully taken into account, and the failure probability of the system cannot be gained. In this 
paper, Fault Tree(FT) method is used to analyze the system reliability at different ground acceleration 
levels, the contribution to the system failure of components having different uncertainty parameters are 
given. And Monte Carlo (MC) simulation [5,6] is used to evaluate the system reliability in seismic 
situation based on different seismic hazard curves, the effect of seismic hazard curve and seismic capacity 
uncertainty are put forward. In section 2, system reliability model under earthquake is described, in 
section3, passive residual heat removal (PRHR) system in AP1000 [7,8] is introduced, the results are 
shown in section4 and the conclusions are given in section5. 
 
Nomenclature 
 
CCF       Common cause failure 
MC         Monte Carlo 
FT          Fault Tree 
HCLPF High Confidence, Low Probability of Failure 
PRHR    Passive residual heat removal system 
PSA  Probabilistic Safety Assessment 
2. System reliability analysis model under earthquake 
2.1. Component failure model 
The component failure probability under earthquake can be described as formula (1) [1] 
)/)(ln( RBAm
af                                                        (1) 
Where,  
 f —  component failure probability under earthquake 
 a —  peak ground acceleration level 
 Am  — median ground acceleration capacity 
 BR  — randomness between earthquake and effects 
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 — standard Gaussian cumulative distribution function 
From formula (1), it can be seen that component failure probability under seismic situation is the 
function of component seismic capacity (Am and BR) and peak ground acceleration level (a), which is 
conditional probability. 
Effect of uncertainty is different for different levels of a/Am, Fig.1 shows the relationship between 
equipment failure probability f and uncertainty BR based on different values of a/Am. 
 
Fig. 1. Effect of BR based on a/Am 
From Fig.1, it can be seen that when a/Am = 0.5, equipment failure probability increases with 
uncertainty increasing, and when a/Am = 0.5, equipment failure probability decreases with uncertainty 
increasing. It can be explained as following:  
 When a < Am, that is, peak ground acceleration level is smaller than equipment median ground 
acceleration capacity, so the uncertainty is larger, the equipment failure probability is higher. 
 When a > Am, that is, peak ground acceleration level is higher than equipment median ground 
acceleration capacity, so the uncertainty is larger, the equipment failure probability is lower. 
 When a=Am, uncertainty has no effect on equipment failure probability. 
Since the uncertainty has different effect when a/Am has different values, a is a stochastic value whose 
distribution is determined by seismic hazard curve, so the seismic hazard curve is an important influence 
key for system reliability under earthquake. 
2.2.  System reliability model 
System reliability depends on the component reliability and system configuration.  Since component 
failure probability is conditional probability of peak ground acceleration level (a) which is a stochastic 
number according with the given probabilistic density distribution, the  MC simulation can be used to 
evaluate the system reliability. The peak ground acceleration level (a) distribution can be gotten from the 
seismic hazard curve, and the flow chart of MC simulation is shown in Fig.2 
3. Passive residual heat removal system in AP1000 
The passive residual heat removal (PRHR) system [7] is a subsystem the passive core cooling system, 
and  the function of PRHR  system is  to  provide  emergency  core  decay  heat  removal  during  transients,  
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Fig. 2. Flow chart of MC simulation  
accidents, or whenever the normal heat removal system paths via the steam generator are lost. The system 
consists of one PRHR heat exchanger (PRHR HX) and associated valves. The heat exchanger is located in 
the in-containment refueling water storage tank (IRWST) which provides the heat sink. And the heat 
exchanger is maintained full of cold reactor coolant at full RCS pressure, which connects to the cold 
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reactor coolant system (RCS) by an inlet line from one RCS hot leg with a normally open motor-operated 
isolation valve that connects to the upper PRHR heat exchanger channel head, and by an outlet line from 
the PRHR heat exchanger to the RCS cold leg with two parallel, normally closed air-operated valves, the 
valves open upon loss of air pressure or on control actuation signal. And the heat exchanger is elevated 
above the RCS loops to induce natural circulation flow when the RCS pumps are not available.  
The IRWST gutter circumnavigates the containment shell, the purpose of which is to collect condensed 
water on the containment shell and, in the event of PRHR actuation, return the water to the IRWST. Under 
normal conditions, two sequent air-operated valves at the outlet line of the gutter are open and the gutter 
sends excess condensate to the liquid radwaste system containment sump. During events with PRHR 
actuation, the air-operated valves close to shut off access to the waste sump, thus the water is returned to 
the IRWST, allowing the PRHR heat exchanger to remain submerged in water. The flow of the PRHR 
system is shown in Fig.3 [7]. 
 
Fig. 3. Flow of Passive Residual Heat Removal System in AP1000 
 
4. Results 
In this paper, FT and MC methods are used to evaluate the reliability of passive residual heat removal 
system, component failure due to earthquake and stochastic events are included, component failure data 
and seismic capacity data are shown in Table 1[7] and Table 2[9], and common cause failure (CCF) 
factor is 0.1 for stochastic failure and 1.0 [10] for failure due to earthquake. 
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Table 1. Component failure data 
Component  Fail to open/close (1/Demand) Operation failure (1/h) 
IRWST / 1.0E-7 
PRHR HX / 1.0E-7 
VALVE 1.1E-3 1.0E-6 
Table 2. Component seismic capacity data 
Component  Ground acceleration capacity Am (g) Uncertainty BR (g) HCLPF (g) 
IRWST 1.3 0.42 0.50 
PRHR HX 2.2 0.46 0.76 
VALVE 3.3 0.61 0.81 
STEAM GEN. 0.98 0.26 0.54 
4.1.  FT analysis 
FT method is used to analyze the system reliability under two conditions: the peak ground acceleration 
is 0.5g and 1 g. The fault tree for PRHR system reliability analysis is shown in Fig.3. 
When the peak ground acceleration (a) is 0.5g, the system failure probability is 2.3e-2, the main 
contributors are shown in Table 3. And when the peak ground acceleration increases to 1g, the system 
failure probability is 7.0e-1, the main contributors are shown in Table 4. 
Table3. Results for a=0.5g 
Failure mode  Failure probability Contribution  
IRWST failure due to earthquake 1.1e-2 45% 
STEAM GEN failure due to earthquake 4.8e-3 20% 
Table4. Results for a=1g 
Failure mode  Failure probability Contribution  
STEAM GEN failure due to earthquake 5.3e-1 76% 
IRWST failure due to earthquake 2.7e-1 39% 
PRHR HX failure due to earthquake 4.3e-2 6.2% 
 
From the results, it can be seen that when the peak ground acceleration (a) is 0.5g which is lower than 
the component seismic capacity, the probability of IRWST failure due to earthquake is higher than that of 
steam generator, though the ground acceleration capacity of IRWST is higher than that of steam generator, 
since the uncertainty of IRWST is higher. And when the peak ground acceleration (a) increases to 1g, the 
probability of IRWST failure due to earthquake is lower than that of steam generator, since the peak 
ground acceleration is close to the ground acceleration capacity of IRWST and steam generator, so the 
influence of uncertainty is much lower than when a=0.5g 
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Fig. 4. FT for PRHR in AP1000 
 
Fig. 5. Seismic hazard curve I  
 
Fig. 6. Seismic hazard curve II 
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Table 5. Results for seismic hazard curve in Fig.5 
Component  Failure Mode  Failure Probability  Contribution  
IRWST fails during operation 2.0e-6 0.44% 
PRHR HX fails during operation 3.0e-6 0.67% 
The valve at the heat exchanger inlet line fails due to stochastic event 2.3e-5 5.1% 
Both of the valves at the heat exchanger outlet line fail to open (CCF) 1.3e-4 29% 
Both of the valves at the heat exchanger outlet line fail during operation (CCF) 1.0e-6 0.22% 
Both of the valves at the IRWST gutter outlet line fail to close(CCF) 1.0e-4 22% 
Both of the valves at the IRWST gutter outlet line fail during operation(CCF) 6.0e-6 1.3% 
IRWST fails due to earthquake  9.2e-5 20% 
PRHR HX fails due to earthquake 1.3e-5 2.9% 
STEAM GEN. fails due to earthquake 5.3e-5 12% 
The valve at the heat exchanger inlet line fails due to earthquake 1.1e-5 2.4% 
Both of the valves at the heat exchanger outlet line fail due to earthquake (CCF) 1.1e-5 2.4% 
Both of the valves at the IRWST gutter outlet line fail due to earthquake(CCF) 1.2e-5 2.7% 
Table 6. Results for seismic hazard curve in Fig.6 
Component  Failure Mode  Failure Probability  Contribution  
IRWST fails during operation 1.0e-6 0.019% 
PRHR HX fails during operation 2.0e-6 0.037% 
The valve at the heat exchanger inlet line fails due to stochastic event 2.8e-5 0.6% 
Both of the valves at the heat exchanger outlet line fail to open (CCF) 1.1e-4 2.0% 
Both of the valves at the heat exchanger outlet line fail during operation (CCF) 2.0e-6 0.037% 
Both of the valves at the IRWST gutter outlet line fail to close(CCF) 1.1e-4 2.0% 
Both of the valves at the IRWST gutter outlet line fail during operation(CCF) 1.0e-6 0.019% 
IRWST fails due to earthquake  2.0e-3 37% 
PRHR HX fails due to earthquake 3.5e-4 6.5% 
STEAM GEN. fails due to earthquake 3.1e-3 57% 
The valve at the heat exchanger inlet line fails due to earthquake 2.8e-4 5.2% 
Both of the valves at the heat exchanger outlet line fail due to earthquake (CCF) 2.6e-4 4.8% 
Both of the valves at the IRWST gutter outlet line fail due to earthquake (CCF) 2.7e-4 5.0% 
4.2. MC analysis 
MC method is used to analyze the system reliability under two seismic hazard curves shown in 
Fig.4[11] and Fig.5. In order to analyze the impact of uncertainty under different seismic hazard curves, 
the peak ground acceleration in Fig.4 is higher than in Fig.3 by 0.5g. 
The results of system reliability analysis for Fig 5 and Fig 6 are shown in Table 5 and Table 6. System 
failure probability is 4.5e-4 for seismic hazard curve in Fig.5, and is 4.7e-3 for seismic hazard curve in 
Fig.6. In order to improve the calculation efficiency, the simulation times is chosen to get the exact value 
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of system reliability, since some failure mode probability is very low, so the calculation error is a little 
high, such as operation failure modes, which are not important to system failure. In Table 5 and Table 6, 
the sum of all failure mode probability is a little higher than the system probability, since two or more 
failure modes can occur in the same round of simulation.  
In Fig.4, peak ground acceleration whose probability is higher is lower than component seismic 
capacity, since the uncertainty of IRWST is higher than that of steam generator the failure probability of 
IRWST due to earthquake is higher than that of steam generator though ground acceleration capacity of 
IRWST is a little higher. As peak ground acceleration increasing, in some rounds of simulation the peak 
ground acceleration can be close to or even more than component seismic capacity data of IRWST and 
steam generator, so in the results shown in Table 6 the failure probability of IRWST due to earthquake is 
lower than that of steam generator. 
5. Conclusions  
In this paper, uncertainty influence on system reliability is analyzed. The results are generally 
according with the result of AP1000 seismic margin evaluation, the failure probability of component with 
higher HCLPF is lower. However, since the effect of uncertainty is related to the ratio of peak ground 
acceleration and component ground acceleration capacity, so the seismic hazard curve is an important key 
to be considered in system reliability analysis. For the same system in different places whose seismic 
hazard curve are different, the system reliability and the main contributors to system failure under 
earthquake may be different. 
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